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A Role for Consciousness in Action Selection
Joanna J. Bryson1
Abstract. This paper argues that conscious attention exists not so
much for selecting an immediate action as for focusing learning of
the action-selection mechanisms and predictive models on tasks and
environmental contingencies likely to affect the conscious agent. It
is perfectly possible to build this sort of system into machine intelli-
gence, but it is not strictly necessary unless the intelligence needs to
learn and is resource-bounded with respect to the rate of learning vs.
the rate of relevant environmental change. Support of this theory is
drawn from scientific research and AI simulations, and a few conse-
quences are suggested with respect to self consciousness and ethical
obligations to and for AI.
1 Introduction
Consciousness is first and foremost a culturally-evolved concept of
uncertain age and origin (Dennett, 2001). As such it is not at all clear
that the many things we call consciousness are truly aspects of a sin-
gle psychological phenomenon. Even were they to be so, we would
not necessarily know the phylogenetic priority between the various
traits we identify with consciousness.
For the purpose of this article at least, I will focus on a completely
functionalist account of consciousness and intelligence more gener-
ally. Consciousness is one evolved element of intelligence, and pre-
sumably serves a role within the cause of intelligence. I will start
from the assumption that the cause of intelligence, it’s essential role,
is primarily to do the right thing at the right time. Intelligence sur-
vives natural selection entirely as a consequence of the advantage the
actions it generates gives its host, and their outcomes in terms of the
agent’s (or at least, the agent’s genes’ Dawkins, 1982; West et al.,
2007) survival and ability to reproduce.
If consciousness is adaptive in nature then it could well be useful
for AI as well. This might not be true if for example consciousness
is essentially a mechanism for implementing serial processing on the
massively-parallel architecture which is the vertebrate brain. Since
AI to date has tended to be minimally concurrent we might even in
that case need some kind of “reverse consciousness” to harness the
power of concurrency with our sequential systems.
In this paper though I analyse a theory that consciousness is a strat-
egy available to agents capable of learning new behaviour to combat
the combinatorics of the search for appropriate actions. I have pre-
viously argued that there exists a class of reaction time results that
are determined not by the cognitive complexity of the task being
performed, as is generally postulated. Rather delays in processing
reflect an allocation of time by the learning-competent agent to on-
line search for a better solutions (Bryson, 2009a,b). The amount of
time allocated to this search in real-time by an individual depends on
its confidence with respect to the task. The more certain an animal
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is, the less time it allocates to searching for a better solution or pre-
diction concerning the situation. There are also species-specific and
life-history components to the duration of the search. An assumption
which we have yet to demonstrate in the laboratory is that the period
of search correlates to conscious attention to the task and the feeling
of awareness.
If we are correct in our accounts, this feeling-of-awareness part of
consciousness can be shown to be shared with monkeys, rats and pre-
sumably many other intelligent vertebrates, though they may spend
less time in this state and more in a state of “automatically” gener-
ating behaviour than the average human. Further, to the extent that
we are willing to call this consciousness, this addresses the ques-
tion of the utility of machine consciousness as well. Where machines
benefit from applying resource bottlenecks to searching for new so-
lutions, they might also benefit from a similar strategy for allocating
those search resources. This would make a machine also functionally
aware of a strategically-limited subset of its environment, rendering
it much like a conscious human.
In this paper I seek to clarify this theory and then examine its im-
plications. In Section 2 I describe conscious attention and cognition
in an evolutionary context. In Section 3 I explain the details of and
evidence for the theory. In Section 4 I describe its application to ma-
chine intelligence, and in Section 5 I briefly examine the theory’s
implications for self consciousness and ethical obligations.
2 Functionalism, Evolution, Cognition and
Learning
If consciousness is useful to intelligence and intelligence is useful to
survival, then why are we not conscious of everything all the time?
Many theories of consciousness assume that it requires some sort
of expensive resource which must unfortunately be limited, perhaps
by metabolic cost or by the size of heads during child birth. Con-
sciousness therefore inherits this scarcity and must be used frugally
— directed with care at only the most important problems.
In general, where we see a variety of solutions of an apparently-
adaptive trait in biology, this indicates a tradeoff between the costs
and benefits of a trait, allowing the perpetuation of roughly equally-
fit variation along the axis projected by this tradeoff. The best-known
example of this is the tradeoff between the number of offspring an
individual can have and the amount of care it can invest in each
of them. Certainly the extent to which species rely on cognitive
strategies for selecting appropriate actions is highly variable. Cog-
nition — by which I mean any real-time, online modelling of the
expected outcomes across some range of behaviour alternatives —
is a broadly unpopular solution ignored by plants and single-cell or-
ganism, though both of these are capable of expressing behaviours in
response to their environment. Bacteria move towards or away from
substances and behave socially with other bacteria to improve their
situation and prospects for preserving their genes, sometimes at the
cost of self-sacrifice (West et al., 2007). Plants are capable of re-
sponding not only to light and nutrients but also to pheromones of
other (e.g. host) species of plants, and to direct their growth accord-
ingly (Trewavas, 2005).
The tradeoff that follows from my proposal in the introduction is
that cognitive strategies generally and consciousness cost time —
time for cognitive processing delays action. Time is expensive. A
delay may mean that another agent takes advantage of a situation
before you. Heubel et al. (2009) demonstrate that mate competition
may explain the failure of male mollies to learn to discriminate the
Amazon molly Poecilia formosa even though ‘mating’ with these
females gives them no fitness benefits. The time it takes to discrimi-
nate the Amazon mollies from females of the male’s own species is
more valuable than the cost of insemination, because those that hesi-
tate are beaten to available conspecific females by those who do not.
Even where there are no other competing agents, the situation may
change before you are yourself able to take advantage of it. For ex-
ample, a strategy for crossing roads must involve reaching decisions
about recognising a safe window for crossing before that window
disappears.
Psychometric research indicates that there is something intrinsi-
cally slow and also something noisy about biological consciousness
(Norman and Shallice, 1986; Cooper et al., 1995). If this is true, then
even within a highly-cognitively-resourced organism it would still
be adaptive to use conscious strategies only when other mechanisms
fail. Norman and Shallice (1986) describe essentially an interrupt-
driven theory of consciousness where the special attention is only
utilised in some circumstances, for example when a task is unfamiliar
or particularly important to get right. The full version of their theory
is at odds with the reports of skilled athletes, artists and musicians
that their accuracy is higher when they are not attending to detail.
However, humans and other cognitive species certainly do seem to
turn our attention not only to tasks that are not familiar, but to any
surprising stimulus. This phenomena underlies the popular looking-
time experimental psychology paradigm for getting at what infants
and other non-linguistic animals know (Spelke et al., 1992; Santos
and Hauser, 2002). Again, here we see the experimentally-validated
premise that organisms attend longer to things that are unfamiliar, or
— in machine learning terms — that they were unable to predict.
What then is the advantage of cognitive approaches that compen-
sates for this loss of time? Apparently, plasticity — the ability to
solve problems and take advantage of opportunities that change more
rapidly than other ways of acquiring action selection rules, e.g. evo-
lution or implicit learning, can manage.
3 Timing, Awareness and Learning
In the previous sections I have argued that a fundamental cost of
consciousness is time. Assuming that consciousness is engaged in
some form of computation, then the source of this time penalty is
combinatorics (Sipser, 2005). There are potentially-infinite combi-
nations of contexts to consider as triggers for an uncountable set of
nuanced actions. However, no agent computes all possible actions
or explanations. Organisms are not only restricted by time. Evolu-
tion has limited organisms’ action and perception abilities, and it
further restricts their capacities to learn to associate actions and per-
ceptions even within their species’ competence. As the behaviourists
proved while failing to validate Skinner’s behaviourism, even simple
stimulus-response conditioning does not work for all stimuli to all re-
sponses. Pigeons can learn to peck for food, but cannot learn to peck
to avoid a shock. They can, however, learn to flap their wings to avoid
a shock, but not for food (Hineline and Rachlin, 1969). Rats pre-
sented with ‘bad’ water learn different cues for its badness depending
on the consequences of drinking it. If drinking leads to shocks, they
condition to visual or auditory cues, but if drinking leads to poison-
ing they learn taste or smell cues (Garcia and Koelling, 1966). These
limitations are not handicaps, but rather adaptive advantages. They
should be seen as a set of prior expectations that accelerate learning
in most situations that animals of a species are likely to find them-
selves in.
The amount of time allocated to cognition is set by at least four
different factors. First, as I proposed in the Introduction and as is
suggested by reaction-time performance on some specialised tasks,
individuals may allocate more attention for longer when they are less
certain that they know how to behave in a context. Second, as im-
plied my account in Section 2, the emphasis placed on cognition by
a species as a whole is a part of its adaptive suite (Thierry, 2007;
Mu¨ller, 2008). Hauser (1999) argues that species of primates such as
tamarins that chase fast prey like insects have limited learning po-
tential because they have evolved to be disinhibited — to maximise
response time at the cost of a capacity to learn. This suggestion is
also supported by Bussey et al. (1998) who report that rats can only
be trained to do task learning using a touch screen if an obstacle is
placed in front of the screen. Being slowed down to crawl over the
obstacle apparently gives them time and / or attention — the mental
presence — to be able to notice a reward schedule.
A similar failure to notice reward schedules triggered my own the-
ory of conscious attention. This time, the failure to learn is in el-
derly macaque monkeys. Rapp et al. (1996) show that aged rhesus
macaques have two peculiarities in their task-learning performance.
First, they do not exhibit a reaction-time (RT) effect traditionally at-
tributed to computation the task requires, yet their performance is
identical to younger animals that do show this RT effect. Second, the
aged macaques do not learn new behaviour when their reward sched-
ule changes, unlike the younger animals that show the RT delay.
The task concerned is transitive inference (TI). This is a standard
cognitive task introduced to developmental psychology by Piaget
(1954) and to experimental psychology through Bryant and Trabasso
(1971). TI formally refers to the process of reasoning whereby one
infers that if, for some quality, A > B and B > C, then A > C. Pi-
aget described TI as an example of concrete operational thought, but
Trabasso demonstrated it in pre-concrete-operational children. It has
now been demonstrated in a variety of animals as well as young chil-
dren (Grosenick et al., 2007). Performance of this “pre-cognitive”
version of TI has a number of associated characteristics. The one
most relevant to the present discussion is the Symbolic Distance Ef-
fect (SDE) reaction-time effect. When subjects execute a transitive
comparison, they operate faster the further away two items are in the
implied sequence. For example, a correct decision on BD would be
slower than one onBE, even ifE is not the last item in the sequence2
If TI were performed by simple inference, then items further apart
would be expected to take longer, because more inferences have to
be performed. That they are in fact faster helped motivate theories
that transitivity learning is somehow innately sequential. Researchers
have hypothesise that the subjects somehow recognise the sequential
organisation of the stimuli and represent it internally in such a way
that further-removed stimuli were more easily discriminated (Bryant
and Trabasso, 1971; Wynne, 1998).
However, the SDE is not a reliable individual effect, only an aggre-
2 End items are by far the easiest stimuli in TI, because unlike intervening
items they are uniformly rewarded. Thus TI studies generally exclude end
items from study.
gate one (McGonigle and Chalmers, 1992). This immediately throws
doubt on any computational account of the SDE. Bryson and Leong
(2007) demonstrate that a stimulus-action model proposed originally
by Harris and McGonigle (1994) can better account for the difficul-
ties subjects have learning the initial stimuli pairs in the first place.
It is actually fantastically difficult for cognitively-limited subjects to
learn that a single stimulus is good in some situations and bad in oth-
ers. Getting a substantial number of individuals to pass criteria on
learning the pairs requires a careful learning regime. Bryson (2009b)
shows that if we assume that animals hesitate before acting on their
training in proportion to their certainty about which stimulus should
take precedence, then this model can replicate the SDE in aggregate
and not in individuals — just as with the live subjects.
Why then do the elderly monkeys used by Rapp et al. (1996) show
neither SDE nor learning when a reward schedule has changed? I
speculate that as monkeys advance in age, the probability increases
that they have learned well the tasks available in their environment,
and so the probability they will benefit from inhibiting acting de-
creases. Their very survival to an advanced age effectively increases
their certainty in their actions — their age correlates to their proba-
bility of being correct. Here this regularity is detected and addressed
physiologically rather than cognitively, with a reduction of neuro-
logical capacity for inhibition. It comes at a cost of reducing their
capacity for learning if the environment does change in unexpected
ways.
How does this relate to consciousness? Until we can replicate the
no-SDE results in humans, we can not be sure. But given both the
monkey and the rat results it seems intuitive that the lack of SDE
correlates with the lack of conscious attention. Few would argue that
consciousness plays an intrinsic role in some forms of learning. Yet
implicit learning can evidently take place and people can act in re-
sponse to things they learn without having an explicit model of what
they are doing. Some researchers report detectable differences in the
quality or reapplicability of what is learned implicitly (Martin and
Alsop, 2004; Alonso et al., 2006), but to at least a superficial level
the differences are often indistinguishable in the context of the task
learned itself (Siemann and Delius, 1993).
What I am claiming here is that there exists a class of learning
tasks that are only likely to be achieved when conducted with con-
scious attention. This class includes at a minimum the capacity to de-
tect better strategies even during the performance of familiar tasks.
This learning takes time, and this time is allocated by the individ-
ual in proportion to their certainty about the performance of the task.
This is the third factor in the allocation of time for cognition men-
tioned at the beginning of this section.
The final, fourth factor is similar, but one we are more aware of
and find less surprising. When we are aware there is a need for a
rapid decision, we can make one. When we do so, we are also more
likely to make errors (Shadlen and Newsome, 1998; Bogacz et al.,
2006). Again, in humans this is a conscious as well as a cognitive
phenomena, but not one I will touch on further in this article.
4 How Much Machine Consciousness Does AI
Need?
As I promised in the Introduction, this paper is not about every as-
pect of consciousness. One of the advantages of AI and simulations
more generally is that we can decompose evolved entities into their
constituent parts, then attempt to demonstrate their resynthesis. If the
resynthesis produces comparable results, we have a viable hypothe-
sis. If our model is the simplest one that accurately describes the
natural phenomenon it models, then it should be taken seriously.
The previous sections argue that conscious awareness — presence
in the moment such as is linked to the formation of episodic mem-
ory — is correlated with the ability to learn not only episodes but
also new reward schemes for task learning. Dennett has called con-
sciousness a spotlight; my theory shifts the metaphor slightly to that
of a searchlight. Action selection would in many cases go forward in
the same way without the searchlight, except that it would in fact be
faster in the darkness. The process of search requires not only special
cognitive capacities but also time.
From a computational or machine learning perspective the advan-
tages of this kind of system is easy to justify. Suppose we have a
system which learns, but it cannot learn fast enough to build a com-
plete model of its environment. This might be either because its en-
vironment keeps changing, or its life is short and its environment is
complex, or because its rate of action depends on the complexity of
its model so it needs to keep its model simple by constantly general-
ising it and forgetting something of the past. At any rate, the system
needs to choose a subset of its environment to concentrate its learn-
ing ability — it’s learning attention — on. What would be a good set
of criteria? Two obvious ones would be:
1. It should focus attention on the actions it is currently taking. This
makes sense because any action it takes now it is likely to need
to take again in the future — the things that it is acting upon are
quite likely to be of some significance to it.
2. It should focus attention longer on things that it attends to but
cannot predict.
If we combine these rules with the predispositions we find in na-
ture to focus attention at least briefly on unexpected, loud or novel
sounds or visual motion, then we might get quite an effective model
of animals like grazing deer or cows. If we added in a drive to ac-
tively explore the manipulation of novel situations and affordances,
we could simulate more creative species like predators or primates.
Of course a pressing concern from an AI perspective is — where
in the action-selection process should the inhibition happen? The an-
swer might seem to be obviously somewhere towards the beginning,
since if a new perspective or alternative is discovered in the time
allocated, selection can be improved. However note that in real an-
imals and children, “looking” knowledge is not perfectly correlated
with acting knowledge (Santos and Hauser, 2002), and indeed some
kinds of learning experiences do not seem to affect action selection
until after a night’s sleep (Ellenbogen et al., 2007). If neuroscience
research like Shadlen’s is representative of more complex tasks, then
it really may be simply a general and ubiquitous slowing of the action
selection process, and the advantages of insight may just be happen-
stance where they occur in time. It seems to me likely that a can-
didate action is chosen quickly and then its execution is inhibited
while the perceptual cues that elicited that response and the expec-
tations driven by the intended action are allowed to play themselves
out in the agent’s working memory to see if alternative strategies be-
come more attractive or alternative explanations seem more likely.
If a better resolution does emerge the agent might be described as
experiencing insight as it flushes its old plan and selects a new one.
5 Implications: Self Knowledge, Language and
Ethics
Obviously there are many other aspects to the public concept of con-
sciousness than these periods of awareness and basic capacities for
learning models and correlations. I would now briefly like to talk
about how some of these may follow from what I propose to be the
most basic aspect of conscious attention.
The most obvious claim is that self consciousness isn’t just con-
sciousness, it’s consciousness of the self, something that obviously
requires a capacity for consciousness and a concept of self. In our
culture, acquisition of the self concept is of course facilitated by lan-
guage and shaped by culture. I stand in complete agreement with the
recent work of Dennett (2009) and more generally with the Extended
Mind Hypothesis (Wheeler, 2010) that consciousness and cognition
more broadly are significantly enhanced, extended by and dependent
on material and social culture. But I do not think that this essential as-
pect of consciousness attention requires language or culture. Further,
I doubt that consciousness is necessary for AI to exploit language and
culture where those are able to be learned by brute force rather than
in a systematic, task-driven way. I would argue that Google Search is
absolutely an AI application that exploits human culture, but I don’t
see a reason to refer to Google Search as conscious.
To return to self consciousness, I doubt also given the difficulty
that children and even adults have in learning that every person is
a person just like they are, that species without human language or
culture do reliably achieve self awareness. Some individuals of so-
cial species do seem to show self consciousness, but I wouldn’t take
that as indicative that every individual is able to apply the rules it has
learned to reason about others’ behaviour to reasoning about its own.
Google on the other hand has many searchable representations of it-
self and treats itself exactly like any other company or web presence.
Thus self-awareness is neither necessary nor sufficient for conscoius-
ness(Bryson, 2004).
One impediment to relatively simple explanations of attention and
self concept such as those above is that our culture has an enormous
amount of moral and ethical associations linked with consciousness.
It is easy to imagine why there would be a confounding of conscious-
ness with ethical obligation. Ethics is an evolved mechanism for sus-
taining societies, and it is most efficient when it appropriately al-
locates responsibility. Those who are aware are more likely to be
responsible than those who are not, and also are more likely to be
affected by our actions towards them. Most of our actions such as
speech and gesture have relatively little impact on someone not aware
of them. Only the conscious can be moral agents, but that does not
necessarily imply that all conscious entities must be treated as moral
agents.
Similarly, the technical definition of suffering involves the require-
ment that an animal’s behaviour changes for the worse even after
the end of the disphoric situation (Haskell et al., 1996). Clearly by
the definitions given above this could only happen if the agent was
learning (or attempting to learn) new behaviour while in the unfortu-
nate situation. Thus this sort of conscious attention is necessary for
an agent to experience suffering. But again, it is not sufficient. Even
humans when in particular neurological states will not suffer even if
they experience severe pain (Dennett, 1978). It is hard to comprehend
some of the effects of anaesthetics, but easier to imagine building a
machine able to learn to perform tasks but not to suffer.
In fact, my own opinion is that we are obliged when we make in-
telligent machines to make ones we are not obliged to (Bryson, 2000,
2009c, 2010). We can avoid uniqueness of body, and where there is
uniqueness of mind we can ensure it is backed up appropriately. Fur-
ther, any machine we build we will have built, and even if it acquires
new goals we will have determined the means by which it acquires
them. In this, machines and artifacts more generally are fundamen-
tally different from the agents that evolved naturally along with us,
including other people. In my opinion we should always view our-
selves as essentially responsible for machines. The human condition
is the process of children aging and becoming responsible first for
themselves, then for their parents, but I see no reason to replicate
this process with AI. Originally, our ethical systems co-evolved with
our societies (de Waal, 1996; Whitehouse et al., 2011). Now as our
societies change rapidly, much of this ‘evolution’ is through deliber-
ated legislation. I believe the most stable solution for human society
is to value humanity over robots and maintain our responsibility for
the machines we make. Otherwise there will be a moral hazard for
people to commit violence and vandalism through their machines.
Whether the machines are capable of learning while they are acting
has little impact on the consequences for human society if we allow
each other to displace our responsibility onto our creations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the most essential part of what we
ordinarily call consciousness — that part that generates awareness of
the moment and episodic memory — is a learning system associated
with but not necessary for action selection in mammals. It provides a
capacity for learning subtle contingencies in action selection — for
noticing (for example) that a reward schedule has changed within an
apparently-familiar task. I have suggested that the reason we are not
conscious of everything at all times is simple combinatorial complex-
ity — the fact that learning takes time and time is valuable.
I have suggested that machines will need this sort of attention only
to the extent that they need to learn new skills or models and that
they are limited in their ability to learn. In this case they would also
need a heuristic for focusing their available capacity. Again only in
this case, the heuristic that has evolved for us is likely to be useful
for them as well — to allocate attention on the actions you actually
perform, and for a time in proportion to your uncertainty about your
next action. Consciousness allows you to predict changes in your
immediate environment, including those expected to result from your
action.
Finally, I have argued that this sort of attention is necessary but not
sufficient for a variety of other phenomena we associate with con-
sciousness — particularly ethical phenomena. It is however neither
necessary nor sufficient for self concept in AI, but almost certainly
precedes it in human and animal cognition.
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